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The paper has  three parts.  In the  first  part  ExtOSR, an extended version of  Ontic  Structural  
Realism,  will  be  introduced.  ExtOSR considers  structural  properties  as  ontological  primitives,  
where structural properties are understood as comprising both relational and structurally derived  
intrinsic properties or structure invariants. It is argued that ExtOSR is best suited to accommodate  
gauge symmetry invariants and zero value properties. In the second part, ExtOSR will be given a  
Humean shape by considering structures as categorical and global. It will be laid out how such  
structures serve to reconstruct non-essential structural kinds and laws. In the third part Humean  
structural realism will be defended against the threat of quidditism.
Part 1: Structural Realism and Intrinsicality: OSR extended
Many structural realists agree on two claims: they prefer ontic over epistemic versions of 
SR and they don't want to dismiss the idea of relata altogether. Therefore non-eliminative 
versions of ontic structural realism have become fashionable. They start from the idea that 
there  are  relations  and  relata,  but  that  there  is  nothing  more  to  the  relata  than  the 
'structural properties' in which they stand. But what are 'structural properties'? Are they 
all  and only relations? Or must we allow for certain intrinsic properties  as well?  I  do 
believe that, in order to cope with symmetry structures, one has to accept certain intrinsic 
features.  The main reason is  that  symmetry  structures  come inevitably  equipped with 
certain  invariants  under  the symmetry.  And symmetries  and symmetry  considerations 
play an eminent  role  in modern physics,  notably as external  spacetime structures  and 
internal gauge symmetry structures. So SR proponents should take symmetry structure to 
be the most relevant structure of the world.
A symmetry of a domain D may be considered a set of one-to-one mappings of D onto 
itself,  the  symmetry  transformations,  such  that  the  structure  of  D  is  preserved.  The 
symmetry transformations form a group and exemplify equivalence relations (which lead 
* Philosophy Department, University of Magdeburg, Germany; Email: lyre@ovgu.de
1
to a partitioning of D into equivalence classes). From this we always get invariants under a 
given symmetry providing properties shared by all members of D. And insofar as such 
properties belong to any member of D irrespectively of the existence of other objects, they 
are 'intrinsic'. On the other hand, they do not suffice to individuate the members, since all  
members share the same invariant properties in a given domain. They are, in a still to be 
spelled out sense, 'parasitic' on the global structure. In my 2010 I call them “structurally 
derived  intrinsic  properties“.  They  violate  the  strong  Leibniz  principle:  as  structure 
invariants they only serve to individuate domains, not entities.
Now consider non-eliminative OSR as a position characterized by the claim that there are 
relations  and  relata,  but  that  there  is  nothing  more  to  the  relata  than  the  structural 
properties in which they stand. We may then distinguish two versions:
• Simple OSR (SimpOSR): structural properties are only relational properties,
• Extended  OSR  (ExtOSR):  structural  properties  are  relational  and  structurally 
derived intrinsic properties (invariants of structure).
ExtOSR is the version favoured here (formerly labelled as „intermediate SR“ in my 2010). 
In the taxonomy of Ainsworth (2010), ExtOSR is either a non-eliminativist OSR1 or close to 
OSR3,  which  takes  relations  and  properties  as  ontological  primitives,  but  objects  as 
derived. And yet none of the categories really fits. The reason why Ainsworth's taxonomy 
seems to be transverse to ours is that it isn't fully exhaustive, which is why he discusses 
subcategories  of  all  three  versions  that  basically  differ  in  the  way  objects  are  (re-) 
constructed. I will argue in favour of a modification of a bundle view of objects below.
In  Lyre  (2010)  the  Gedankenexperiment  of  a  lone  electron  is  introduced  to  show the 
differences  between SimpOSR and ExtOSR.  Under  both  eliminative  and SimpOSR the 
lone electron cannot have a charge, since no other objects are left in virtue of which the 
electron's charge might be considered as relational. Under ExtOSR it is perfectly possible 
to  allow,  even  in  the  trivial  case  of  only  one member  in  D,  for  the  object  to  possess 
symmetry-invariant  properties.  I  should  emphasize  that  this  Gedankenexperiment  is 
exclusively meant to highlight the difference between SimpOSR and ExtOSR – it has a 
didactic value only. By no means do I claim, nor should ExtOSR proponents claim, that  
such a possible world is a nomologically possible world. Of course it isn't. It conflicts with 
QED  and  other  fundamentally  physical  as  well  as  operational  assumptions.  But  it 
nevertheless  highlights  a  metaphysical  difference.  An  object  may  have  its  invariant 
properties  according to the world's  structure,  the structure comes equipped with such 
properties. Moreover, such invariant properties should not be considered as relational to 
the  structure,  since  this  raises  the  problem  of  the  possible  Platonic  existence  of 
unexemplified structures. I take it that almost all OSR proponents of any stripe consider 
themselves  to  be  in  re-structuralists,  not  ante  rem-Platonists.  The world  structure  must 
therefore be an instantiated structure – instantiated by at least one member of D.
As far as I can see it, the most convincing reason from physics why we must take structure 
invariants  seriously  stems  from gauge  symmetries.  I  will  give  another  argument,  the 
argument  of  zero-value  properties,  below.  It  is  obvious  that  the content  of  modern 
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fundamental  theories  in  physics  is  mainly  given  by symmetry  structures.  And in  this 
respect,  gauge  theories  figure  as  the  most  important  case.  But  gauge  symmetries  are 
special  in  the  sense  that  they  are  non-empirical  symmetries.  This  means  that  gauge 
symmetry transformations  possess no real instantiations, the physical content of gauge 
theories  is  carried  all  and  only  by  the  gauge  symmetry  invariants  (Lyre  2004).  Such 
invariants  are mathematically fully characterised (but not solely given) by the Casimir 
operators of the gauge groups (the Casimirs classify the multipletts and commute with the 
generators of the gauge Lie groups which correspond to the charges). We get mass and 
spin as Casimir operators of the Poincaré group and the various charges of the U(1)xSU(2) 
and SU(3) interaction groups. Hence, mass, spin, and charge (in the most general sense) 
are  the  most  fundamental  `structurally  derived  intrinsic  properties'.  By  focusing 
exclusively on relational properties,  SimpOSR doesn't have the resources to take gauge 
theories into account, while ExtOSR apparently does.
But  there's  more.  Elementary  particle  physics  provides  us  with  a  taxonomy  of  the 
fundamental building blocks of the world. By characterizing particles via mass, spin, and 
charge,  physicists  regularly  ascribe  zero-value  properties  to  particles.  They  will  for 
instance say that the photon has zero mass or that the neutrino has an electric charge with 
value zero.  As  Balashov (1999)  points  out,  such zero  values  aren't  merely  absences  of 
quantities or holes in being, they are considered to be as real as non-zero value properties. 
Balashov makes the following case: „Suppose particle a is a bound state … of two particles 
… having non-zero quantities P+ and P-summing up to 0. … it is more reasonable to say 
that  a has zero value of P ... than to insist that it has no P at all. P-hood cannot simply 
disappear when combined with another P-hood in a productive way.“ He calls this the 
argument from composition. But elementary particles aren't composites. We may, however, 
extend  the  argument  by  using  parity  and unification  considerations  to  non-composite 
cases. P-hood may figure as part of the explanation of the generic behaviour of a particle in 
certain circumstances both in the case of P≠0 and P=0. Conservation laws are the most 
important case of such explanations. We do for instance predict the behaviour of the yet  
undetected Higgs boson in part by the fact that it is assumed to have spin zero.
Consider  also  the  well-known  classification  of  elementary  particles  by  means  of  the 
irreducible  unitary  representations  of  the  Poincaré group  (cf.  also  my  2004).  The 
assumption behind it is that physical systems must possess relativistically invariant state 
spaces  with  the  most  elementary,   irreducible  representations  possessing  no  invariant 
subspaces.  And  as  we've  already  seen,  the  representations  of  the  Poincaré group are 
mathematically  fully  characterized  by  its  Casimir  operators.  This  whole  consideration 
affects all particles including the ones with zero mass, zero spin or both, since all particles 
are considered to be representations of the Poincaré group.
ExtOSR,  I  claim,  naturally  embraces  the  appearance  of  zero-value  properties  in 
fundamental physics by assuming that the world consists of a structure mainly given by 
the structure of the fundamental physical gauge groups (including the Poincaré group as a 
gauge  group  itself).  Particles  are  instantiations  of  the  world  structure  possessing  all 
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structurally invariant properties irrespective of whether the property value is zero or not. 
In what follows below I will show how this class of properties can also be accommodated 
from a non-dispositionalist point of view (pace Balashov (1999) who argues otherwise).
Yet another commentary is necessary here. Recently, Roberts (2010) has coined the term 
'group  structural  realism'  for  the  idea  of  identifying  structure  with  the  structure  of 
symmetry groups. While on the one hand he acknowledges the fact that group structural 
realism has the advantage to provide us with a precise mathematical notion of structure, 
he on the other hand side diagnoses an, as he sees it, serious problem: the problem of an  
infinite regress of structures. Consider for instance the hierarchy that one can produce by 
ascending from a group G to Aut G, the group of all automorphisms of G, next to Aut Aut  
G and so on.  But,  as  Roberts  himself  also acknowledges,  the structural  realist  account 
“perhaps most closest to the right attitude” is to accept just the groups that are most naturally 
suggested by physics as the fundamental bottom of towers of structures. This is exactly the 
recipe I like to suggest here. While it is true that you can't easily read off your metaphysics 
from physics, one should nevertheless let physics be the main and solid guide in choosing 
the right metaphysics. And this in particular holds if we have an underdetermination in 
metaphysics which can be cured by physics! For this is just what Roberts does: construct 
an overblown and therefore underdetermined metaphysical hierarchy that can easily be 
cut back by physics as our primary guide.
Mention must finally be made that the present account is not bound to group structures. 
Surely, symmetry groups play a dominant role,  but other structures come into play as 
well. The structural core of quantum theory is for instance given by the non-commutative 
algebra structure of the observables. It is, again, a physical, not a metaphysical question, 
what the fundamental structures in nature are.
Part 2: Humean Structural Realism: Structural Kinds and Structural Laws
After laying out ExtOSR as my favoured variant of structural realism, I shall now turn, for 
the rest of the paper,  to the question of whether and in which sense I think structural 
realism can be combined with a Humean stance. I shall start with the issue of structural 
laws and then go over, in the third section, to defend non-modal categorical structures.
In its usual form, Humeanism rests on two basic features:  first,  the idea of an ultimate 
supervenience base – this is the reductionist spirit behind Humeanism. And, second, a 
quite rigorous scepticism about modalities – call this is the nominalist spirit. I shall focus 
on  how this  affects  the  Humeanist's  view  about  properties  and  laws.  Let's  start  with 
properties. From their nominalist inclinations it seems clear that Humeans will be non-
dispositionalists  and  non-essentialists,  that  is  they  will  favour  categorical  over 
dispositional (or modal) properties. It is of course not part of the Humean agenda that one 
must favour intrinsic over relational properties as in David Lewis' infamous doctrine of 
Humean supervenience.  Moreover,  Lewis' Humean supervenience is in glaring conflict 
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with both quantum mechanics and gauge theories.  In  both types of  theories non-local 
effects – EPR correlations on the one hand and holonomy effects on the other – suggest a 
stark violation of Humean supervenience: intrinsic properties of wholes do not supervene 
on intrinsic properties of their parts. By way of contrast, intrinsic properties of wholes may 
very well supervene on non-supervenient relations between the parts.
The  natural  supervenience  base  for  structuralists  consists,  of  course,  of  structures. 
Structures, in turn, seem to be “composed” out of relata and structural properties, being 
relations  and  structurally  derived  intrinsic  properties.  Leaving  notorious  questions  of 
ontological priority for a moment aside, we can just say that the Humean structuralist  
shall consider non-modal, categorical structures as the proper supervenience base. And 
there are two aspects of such structures that are of interest here. There is on the one hand 
the aspect of categoricalism – this will be discussed below. On the other hand there's the 
aspect of such structures as being global entities.  This is  why the idea of structures as 
'composites' must be taken with a grain of salt. If we think of the fundamental symmetry 
structures  in physics,  then we better  conceptualize them as reflecting global  regularity 
features of the world in toto. They neither are abstract mathematical ante rem-structures nor 
are they composed out of universals (as discussed by Psillos, forthcoming). They rather are 
concrete global and world-like in re-structures.
We  may  capture  this  characterisation  by  noticing  that  the  usual  metaphysical 
abstract/particular distinction must be complemented with a global/local distinction. We 
then arrive at the following matrix:
concrete abstract
local particular universal
global in re-structures ante rem-structures,
universal structures,
mathematical structures
Particulars  or concreta  are local  and concrete  entities,  whereas  universals  are abstract. 
They  are  'local'  in  the  sense  that  they  are  instantiated  by local  exemplars.  By  way of 
contrast,  structures  aren't  local,  they are  global  or  world  entities.  They may either  be 
considered as abstract with mathematical structures as a prime example, but they may 
also be construed as concrete entities in the sense that they are directly given as elements 
of the spatiotemporal world  in toto.  This, I suggest, is the conception of structures that 
should be preferred by OSR proponents.
There  are  of  course  structuralists  that,  albeit  coming  close  to  the  group  theoretic 
considerations here, adopt an ante rem view of abstract structures (e.g. Kantorovich 2009 or 
Cao 2010). Psillos (forthcoming), following Bigelow and Pargeter (1990), discusses the pros 
and cons of the idea to construe structures as abstract entities or 'structural universals'. He 
diagnoses various difficulties of this view which can basically be traced back to the idea 
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that such structural universals may have other universals as parts (as displayed in various 
cases  of  molecule  configurations).  I  take  this  to  indicate  that  we  better  refrain  from 
characterizing  structures  as  abstract.  As  far  as  I  can  see,  however,  none  of  Psillos' 
arguments speak against the possibility of structures as concrete elements of the world  in  
toto.  In  considering  structures  as  global  or  holistic  entities  the  question  of  ontological 
priority  of  either  relata  or  structural  properties  turns  out  as  misguided.  If  talk  of 
ontological priority makes sense at all, then structures as a whole should be prioritized. 
Ainsworth's (2010) taxonomy should be supplemented by (at least) a fourth option (OSR4) 
which takes whole structures as basic and structural properties – relations and intrinsic 
invariants  –  as  features  of  such  structures.  From  them  relata  can  be  derived  or 
reconstructed in the following sense: they are the placeholders between the relations and 
they are domain-wise individuated by the structural invariants which serve as structurally 
derived intrinsic properties of the relata.
This is also the reason why structuralism doesn't entirely collapse to variants of a bundle  
ontology. For instance, because of its nominalist spirit (and as will become clear in the next 
section),  the  ExtOSR  version  defended  in  this  paper  is  close  to  an  ontology  of  trope 
bundles.  But bundles are usually construed as local.  The picture I'd like to advocate is 
rather  that  the  world  consists  of  a  global  structure  which  can  only  approximately  be 
reconstructed by a collection of more or less localizable objects. Another way of spelling 
out the worries about the 'local' is to say that structuralism seems to directly conflate with 
pointillisme – the doctrine that a physical theory's fundamental quantities are defined at 
spacetime points and represent intrinsic properties of point-sized objects located there (cf. 
Butterfield 2011 as a forceful attack on pointillisme).
As we've seen, the structural invariants emphasized here provide us with properties that 
are  shared  by all  members  in  a  structure  domain and thus  serve  to  individuate  such 
domains.  In  fact,  they  provide  us  with  a  concept  of  kinds  –  natural  kinds.  Generally 
speaking, natural kinds are human-independent groupings or orderings of particulars in 
nature. And it is one of the major tasks of science to reveal the kinds in nature, for if such 
kinds exist then we may expect our scientific explanations to become forceful precisely 
when they generalize over such kinds. But while it is straightforward to think of kinds as 
shared properties, the real problem is to understand what the reason for this 'sharing' is.  
Yet Humeanists usually don't provide an answer to this problem, since nine times out of 
ten they stick with a regularity view of laws. The orthodox account of natural kinds is 
therefore bound to essentialism, the view that there are essences in nature. Under such a 
view  the  shared  properties  that  make  up  a  kind  are  essential  properties.  Essential 
properties  are  modal  properties  in  the  sense  that  the  particulars  that  possess  them 
necessarily belong to the kind.
A rigorous Humean framework is incompatible with an essentialist conception of natural 
kinds. A remarkable feature of structural invariants, I claim, is however that they provide 
us with a non-modal Humean understanding of kinds without giving up the possibility of 
a further explanation for the universal sharing of certain features. For we may understand 
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the  perplexing  empirical  fact  that,  say,  all  electrons  posses  exactly  the  same property 
values for mass, spin and charge. These properties are in this sense universal properties. 
From the point of view of ExtOSR we may just trace this universality back to the globally 
built-in regularity of the world as possessing particular symmetry structures. That is to say 
we must not acquiesce the individual property-likeness of particular electrons as a brute 
fact of nature, as the traditional regularity view has it, but reduce it to the global world  
structure  (e.g.  particular  gauge  groups).  Note  that  no  necessity  is  involved  in  this 
conception since the global world structure itself is non-modal in the sense that it is a 
brute fact of nature that just this particular global structure exists. We have thus shifted 
the regularity  one step further,  from the level  of  local  to  global  concrete  entities.  This 
conception of natural kinds might be dubbed a 'structural kinds' view. It is the conception 
of kinds offered by ExtOSR within a Humean framework.
To invoke structural kinds also means to invoke structural laws. For laws generalize over  
kinds. Structural laws, in turn, generalize over structural kinds. This is tantamount to say 
that structural laws just reflect the structures in nature. In the case of the fundamental 
physical  structures  the  structural  laws  are  essentially  the  mathematical  equations  that 
display the relevant  symmetries.  The symmetries  are global  built-in regularities  of  the 
world in the sense that other symmetries could exist as built-in instead. Obviously, this is  
in tune with a strict non-necessitarian conception of laws – and goes beyond structural 
realists' talk about 'modally informed' laws (Cei & French 2010 – though I'm of course very 
much in favour of the general tendency of this paper). Moreover, and as I've pointed out 
in my 2010 (sec. 22), the Humean structural laws view has the resources to overcome well-
known problems of the orthodox regularity view such as non law-like regularities  (by 
considering only global  structures)  and empty laws (by considering instantiated  in  re-
structures only).
Part 3: Humean Structural Realism: Categorical Structures
Humean SR sees structures as non-modal, categorical structures. They bring about nothing 
and constitute the Humean structuralist's supervenience base. They are “just there”. Other 
structures could have been instantiated – or could be instantiated at any new moment in 
time (although more must be said, but cannot be said in paper due to lack of space, about 
the temporal structure of the 4D world; see also the short remarks in the conclusion). As 
non-modal,  categorical and determinate structures they should be taken as brute facts, 
ontologically irreducible, and primitive.
But  there's  a  strong  movement  within  structural  realism  to  prefer  modal  or  causal 
structures  (e.g.  Chakravartty  2007).  The  perhaps  most  outspoken  proponent  of  this 
movement is Michael Esfeld (2009, 2011, Esfeld and Lam 2011). As he sees things, „the 
fundamental physical structures possess a causal essence,  being powers“ (Esfeld 2009). 
Esfeld  claims  to  overcome a  couple  of  well-known difficulties  connected  to  structural 
realism. The two most relevant problems are:
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(1) The mathematical/physical distinction of structures,
(2) The problem of quiddities and humility.
Let's start with the mathematical/physical distinction (1). Esfeld believes that by assuming 
categorical structures Humean SR collapses to mathematical structuralism. He argues that 
while  mathematical  structures  do  not  cause  anything,  real  physical  structures  clearly 
distinguish  themselves  from  mere  mathematical  structures  in  that  they  are  causally 
efficacious. 
I have two worries here. First, Esfeld raises the problem in such a way that it doesn't come 
out as a special problem of (particular versions of) structural realism, but of Humeanism 
or categoricalism in general. Any non-modal account of entities is affected by his kind of 
reasoning:  causal  efficacy  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  a  Humean  mosaic  of  non-
dispositional properties but only by dispositional ones. But should we really consider this 
to be a knock-out argument against Humeanism? Dispositionalism will then become true 
by fiat. But you can't decide metaphysical debates like that. Humeans and non-Humeans 
agree that there are cause-effect regularities in our world. They disagree about the way 
how to conceptualize them metaphysically. It is of course true that we know about the 
various structures in physics by means of their causal efficacy. But this says nothing about  
the metaphysical conception of causation. Causal efficacy can very well  be captured in 
regularist  terms.  Nothing in Esfeld's  arguments enforces a metaphysically thick modal 
nature of structures.
But perhaps the real worry of Esfeld about structures with 'no causal contact' to the world 
lies elsewhere. In his 2009 he still sticks with SimpOSR and, hence, rejects any intrinsic 
properties  (withdrawn  by  Esfeld  and  Lam  2010,  sec.  8.4).  Under  this  conception  the 
question of how regularities of a pure microscopic web of relations hinge together with 
macroscopic causes and effects  might indeed cause a certain uneasiness.  However,  the 
problem  at  this  point  is  not  the  metaphysics  of  causation,  but  the  notorious 
multirealizability  of  purely  relationally  individuated  structures.  By  way  of  contrast, 
ExtOSR  introduces  structurally  derived  intrinsic  properties  to  individuate  structure 
domains.  This  provides  us with an account to  circumvent  the  problem of 'unintended 
domains' (cf. Lyre 2010, sec. 12ff). By introducing structure invariants the nature of the 
relations and relata in the structure is no longer completely indetermined. The idea is that 
in our experimental practice we are (more or less directly) acquainted with the intrinsic 
structure invariants. Hence, no multirealizability arises.
So let's go over to the second class of problems centred around quidditism and humility 
(2). As Esfeld (2009: 182) puts it:  „If the fundamental properties are categorical and intrinsic,  
then  there  are  worlds  that  are  different  because  they  differ  in  the  distribution  of  the  intrinsic  
properties that are instantiated in them, although there is no difference in causal and nomological  
relations  and  thus  no  discernible  difference  between  them.  This  position  therefore  implies  
quidditism and humility.“ My first answer is that this is (again!) no special problem of SR, 
but of categoricalism in general. This seems to be granted by Esfeld:  „what accounts for  
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quidditism  and  humility  is  the  categorical  character  of  the  fundamental  properties,  not  their  
supposed intrinsic character“ (Esfeld 2009: 187). In fact, he considers the threat of quidditism 
to  be the master  argument against  categoricalism:  only  causal  properties  prevent  from 
quiddities,  because if all properties  are causal and, hence, individuated by their  causal 
profile only, then there's no room for extra quiddistic factors over and above the causal 
profile. 
I  certainly share Esfeld's worries about mysterious extra-metaphysical factors, which is 
what quiddities really are. But, I'm afraid, the antidote of causal properties isn't as strong 
as Esfeld wants it  to be.  This has rightly been pointed out by Psillos (forthcoming) by 
means of the following consideration. Suppose a world W1 in which two properties A and 
B work in tandem to produce a certain effect E but, taken individually, don't have any 
effect  at  all.  Dispositionalism cannot  distinguish  W1 from a  world  W2 in  which  E  is 
brought about by one single property. The metaphysical difference between W1 and W2 
goes beyond causal roles. So this would be my second answer to (2): quidditism is the  
view that nomological roles do not supervene on properties, but nomological roles do not 
supervene on causal properties either!
So it seems that neither the dispositionalist nor the categoricalist can entirely get rid of any 
mysteriously hidden metaphysical factors. But clearly it would be neat if in particular the 
structural realist could obviate the threat of quidditism – at least to a certain extent. Well, I 
believe he can. This paves the way to a third answer to Esfeld's worries about quidditism. 
Here's a passage from Lewis who famously pronounced humility against quiddities:  „I  
accept quidditism. I reject haecceitism. Why the difference? It is not, I take it, a difference in prima  
facie plausibility. ... In both cases alike, however, we can feel an uncomfortable sense that we are  
positing  distinctions  without  differences.  […]  To  reject  haecceitism  is  to  accept  identity  of  
qualitatively  indiscernible  worlds;  to  reject  quidditism  is  to  accept  identity  of  structurally  
indiscernible worlds – that is, worlds that differ just by a permutation or replacement of properties.
[...] It would be possible to combine my realism about possible worlds with anti-quidditism. I could  
simply insist that ... no property is ever instantiated in two different worlds. … It could be for the  
sake of upholding identity of structurally indiscernible worlds, but I see no good reason for wanting  
to uphold that principle“ (Lewis 2009: 209-210). While Lewis doesn't see a good reason for 
upholding the identity  of  structurally  indiscernible  worlds,  structural  realists  certainly 
should. For structural realism is precisely the doctrine that is based on such a principle.  
We may even use the identity of structurally indiscernible worlds, or, shorter, the identity  
of isomorphs, to define SR and its major variants. While ESR is captured by the claim that 
the world is known up to structural isomorphs, OSR is the view that the world exists up to 
such isomorphs only. Surely, Lewis wouldn't be convinced by such a manoeuvre of simply 
'quining quiddities' by means of the identity of isomorphs, since I've given no metaphysical 
reason  to  dismiss  quiddities.  Nevertheless,  the  identity  of  isomorphs  is  empirically 
supported to the extent to which structural realism is empirically supported by modern 
physics. So let me repeat the recipe already suggest at the end of section 1: one should let  
physics be the main and solid guide in choosing the right metaphysics, particularly in 
cases of seemingly metaphysical excesses.
9
A  fourth  and  final  attempt  to  counter  worry  (2)  is  the  following.  Quidditism  claims 
primitive  suchness.  It's  the  idea  that  a  permuation  of  properties  (or  types)  makes  a 
difference. It follows that quidditism may also be understood as upholding the principle 
of  trans-world  property  identity,  since  quiddities  are  instantiated  at  different  possible 
worlds. This is quite in analogy to the traditional idea of universals as being instantiated in 
different spacetime regions. But why should one uphold such a principle? A Humeanist 
clearly  wouldn't.  Tropes  as  well  as  categorical  structures  violate  trans-world  property 
identity,  since both tropes and categorical  structures as (examples of) entities  suited to 
constitute  a   proper  Humean  base  are  individuals.  So  neither  tropes  nor  categorical 
structures are ever instantiated at two different worlds. While Esfeld's master argument 
wants  to  tell  us  that  Humeanism  implies  quidditism,  the  contrary  seems  to  be  true:  
Humeanism virtually contradicts quidditism.
So neither is there any special problem with the distinction between the mathematical and 
the physical for Humean SR, nor does dispositionalism fare so much better in rejecting 
quidditism. But then the question must be raised what makes dispositionalism attractive 
at all. And here, as far as I can see, we should be quite reluctant. For the real problem with 
traditional dispositionalism is that it sticks with pointillism, the view that the fundamental  
quantities in physics are defined at local regions of spacetime.  Structuralism, as we've 
seen, should however be construed as fundamentally holistic and conforming to globally 
defined entities, which is just what structures are. By way of contrast, the picture of local  
powers is a hopelessly outdated and naïve metaphysical picture of physics (to say the 
least). From this perpective, to combine dispositionalism with structuralism then means to 
try to combine two deeply opposing pictures, which in turn means that to prevent from 
quiddities  by  introducing  mystic  causal  powers  amounts  to  curing  one  metaphysical 
exaggeration with another one.
Conclusion
In this paper I've argued for an extended version of OSR, ExtOSR, that takes structural 
properties  as  ontological  primitives,  where  structural  properties  are  understood  as 
comprising  both  relational  and  structurally  derived  intrinsic  properties  (structure 
invariants).  ExtOSR  is  best  suited  to  accommodate  gauge  invariants  and  zero  value 
properties.  I've then connected this  with a Humean approach,  in which one considers 
categorical and global structures to constitute the Humean supervenience base. As global 
entities  the structures  display a  built-in  global  regularity  and serve  to  understand the 
universality of the fundamental properties without invoking essences and, thus, providing 
us with a concept of non-essential structural kinds and laws.
The Humean position of structural realism just sketched avoids mysterious modal powers 
and ungrounded dispositions – but raises new questions, too. Of particular interest is most 
certainly how dynamics and temporal change fit into the overall picture of non-modal and 
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global structures. A straightforward answer is that the group of temporal automorphisms 
of the state space is of course itself a structure. Another straightforward but at the same 
time extreme option would be to adopt something along the lines of either a perdurantist 
view or a block universe conception and take the entire four-dimensional world structure  
for granted. To whatever extent the structural realist wants to address these questions, it's 
definitely a topic that deserves further scrutinization.
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